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Alexander George is one of political science’s most re-
spected innovators and teachers of qualitative research de-
sign, and he and his former student Andrew Bennett have now
teamed up to produce what is likely to become an influential
text. It presents George’s influential methodological ideas to-
gether in one place for the first time and develops and defends
them further with new contributions by Bennett added through
close collaboration. I believe their book makes several valu-
able new contributions and also has a few limitations, one of
them rather important.
Major Contributions
One major contribution is strong advocacy on behalf of
qualitative case study (CS) methods, especially process-trac-
ing. Doctoral education in political science was biased in favor
of quantitative methods for decades (until the 1990s, at least),
and this imbalance surely diminished our profession’s recep-
tivity to qualitative methods. This new volume adds a wel-
come corrective, joining King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and
more recently, Brady and Collier (2004) and Sprinz and
Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004). Chapter 1 emphasizes several com-
parative advantages of CS methods for theory development,
especially theory that will help practitioners in governments.
Perhaps the most significant strength is the fertility of CS
research in generating new concepts and hypotheses that are
likely to be empirically valid. The book argues that case stud-
ies are also especially strong for improving the validity of our
concepts and avoiding “conceptual stretching”; for explor-
ing the operation of causal mechanisms; and as ways to ac-
commodate complex causal relations such as equifinality, in-
teraction effects, and path dependency. I would add that case
studies often have an advantage over statistical methods
when the objective is to study a process. Case studies also
add to the literature more information about the cases studied
than is possible with statistical methods covering the same
cases, information which may be used by later researchers.
Bennett and George also defend against widely-heard criti-
cisms of CS methods—such as the selection bias problem—
that fail to give sufficient credit for their advantages.
Second, the book offers a philosophical standard for evalu-
ating research and methods different from the standard under-
lying statistical explanation, strengthening its defense against
critiques from the latter quarter. Chapter 7 draws especially on
Wesley Salmon’s innovations in philosophy of science (1990),
defining theoretical explanation as knowledge of the hidden
causal mechanisms that generate observable events.  George
and Bennett contrast exploration of causal mechanisms with
the deductive-nomological model and the estimation of “causal
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.997523
38
                        Qualitative Methods, Spring 2006
effects” as defined by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). The
book includes criticism of Designing Social Inquiry at several
points where they feel this influential text got it wrong.  They
also reject the postmodern position that it is impossible to
separate the object from the researcher or to develop cumula-
tive theory. In developing a philosophical foundation the book
goes deeper than the authors’ earlier publications.
At the same time, they are not satisfied with the quality of
some published case studies. In hopes of improving scholarly
practice, they offer a practical handbook for students, laying
out steps by which to implement the techniques pioneered by
George with collaborators Richard Smoke and Timothy Mc-
Keown. The main ideas had already been published, but pre-
senting them together in this book allows greater development
and more examples.
The book details several varieties of within-case process-
tracing, defining the idea flexibly— it ranges from atheoretical
narrative at one extreme to even a variant that “constructs a
general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal
process” (211). George and Bennett argue that process-trac-
ing is especially useful for finding multiple causal paths that
lead to the same outcome, for explaining deviant cases, for
improving theories that are not specified sufficiently, and for
testing theories. They emphasize that adding within-case tech-
niques can improve causal inferences in a study that compares
multiple cases.
Chapter 11 elaborates on one of their most distinctive
ideas—typological theorizing. The basic idea is to develop a
typology of alternative causal pathways or sets of variables
that produce a phenomenon of interest (states’ contributions
to an alliance, in their example). The typology can be devel-
oped either inductively by studying one case at a time, or
deductively by first defining a logically complete space of po-
tential causal variables, then reducing the space and selecting
cases to study each type. The technique is illustrated con-
cretely by reference to Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (1997) on
burden sharing during the first Persian Gulf war. George and
Bennett find that the process of attempting to construct theo-
ries typologically has a salutary effect on the analytical imagi-
nation. It shifts attention from univariate thinking toward think-
ing about combinations of variables and multiple causal paths,
and it exposes inconsistencies in earlier theorizing. Although
this technique has not been widely adopted thus far, it is inter-
esting and this book might encourage more attempts.
The book includes a chapter reviewing the literature on
the inter-democratic peace and shows the complementarity of
case study, statistical, and formal methods over time as well as
the possibility of cumulative theory development. A long ap-
pendix also describes a number of publications in detail to
illustrate the variety of ways in which within-case causal analy-
sis has been used or approximated.
Some Limitations
One minor limitation is that while the proposed methods
are general, the book’s codification of best practice is limited
largely to illustrations from international security studies,
supplemented by some references from comparative politics.
The social scientist will need other books to learn how case
studies have been used extensively in research on the inter-
national political economy, environmental politics, human
rights, institutional change, negotiation, domestic government
program evaluation, educational reform, life in primitive tribes
and urban slums, and other domains of social science (see
Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias [2004] for fuller coverage of
international relations).
Second, Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences tends to equate case study methods with the
historian’s craft and with a particular type of evidence—ar-
chives and other documents. This type is certainly important
and the authors give wise warnings about the pitfalls of using
archives.  But most social science methodologists define case
study methods more broadly. Many in international relations
and other specialties use interviews to collect evidence be-
fore archives are open. Other case studies are based on direct
observation, participant observation, or statistical data. Some
case studies are largely quantitative. Other methods texts (e.g.,
Yin 1994) provide more comprehensive coverage and advice
in this respect.
More important, a neutral reader might feel that the inher-
ent drawbacks of CS methods are not presented quite as force-
fully as the advantages. The book does raise and respond to
complaints and advocates methodological pluralism. To take
an example, one basic complaint is that case study methods
do not support generalizations well because the cases cho-
sen may not be representative of the universe covered by the
theory. The book recommends that case study researchers
concentrate on a subclass of the event of interest, to find
conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and to make
clear that one is not claiming to generalize beyond that sub-
class in a given study (31-32). But this response seems only
to transfer the problem to the subclass level rather than re-
solve it. Typically the case study cannot show that the case
selected is representative of events in the theoretical sub-
class either.
To take another related issue, the authors argue that CS
methods are useful for testing theories, while for many schol-
ars the main point would be that testing is where all case meth-
ods are inferior to statistical methods. The notion of testing
has more than one dimension and commentators may disagree
because they emphasize different dimensions. A test is more
rigorous, first, the more observations the theory has faced and
the more representative the sample. A second dimension is
how precise the measurement is; the looser a concept’s effec-
tive meaning, the easier it is to fit it to more facts. Statistical
methods are inherently superior on both these dimensions to a
method that can observe only a small number of cases whose
representativeness is unknown (except regarding a determin-
istic theory) and a method that does not quantify its measure-
ments. A third facet of testing, however, is how many rival
explanations have been eliminated by the analysis. Here the
case study is able to consider more candidates, including what
is often called the context, more thoroughly than the statistical
method, in the cases studied by each. The case study can also
check in finer detail for mechanisms that theories assume con
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controlled comparison method fail to achieve its strict require-
ments.”...“Researchers urgently need an alternative to the ex-
perimental paradigm” (151).
This dispute between distinguished users and critics of
these methods might be sorted out better if we focus on the
scientific goal that underlies the methods being advocated.
J.S. Mill in 1843 was writing a book on logic, and the famous
methods appear in his Book III on Induction. He defines in-
duction as “the operation of discovering and proving general
propositions” (Mill 1843, 208). Mill believed the goal of sci-
ence was to “prove” the truth of “invariable laws” “with cer-
tainty” (e.g., 278, 282). He uses these terms repeatedly. It is
with this ultra-ambitious goal in mind that he defines his method
of difference, for example, saying “the two instances which are
to be compared with one another must be exactly similar, in all
circumstances except the one which we are attempting to in-
vestigate” (281).
Thus the claim that Mill’s methods require those hyper-
demanding assumptions is valid only if the researcher aims to
prove with 100% certainty that a general law is true invariably,
by observing only two or three cases. Of course their own
method of process-tracing in the single case would also have
to be discarded if this were the only standard. In the vast
majority of applications it too by itself fails to verify with air-
tight certainty that a general law is true invariably, i.e., in the
many cases that have not been observed. But the point is that
most political scientists abandoned this nineteenth century
version of positivism long ago. After the heyday of Victorian
optimism, verificationism gave way to falsificationism. Then
Lakatos falsified Popper (much to Popper’s disappointment).
Probabilistic explanation came to be the generally accepted
mode of causal analysis.
A more even-handed assessment would treat controlled
comparison using a bit of the flexibility shown when defining
process-tracing. It is more productive in practice to think of
controlled case comparison as an approximation (not an exact
match) to the logic of experiment, with the goal of making at
least a significant partial contribution to (not to prove or test)
a probabilistic causal explanation, in most cases. (Any more
decisive conclusions achieved by testing the occasional de-
terministic theory would be further to its credit.) Today’s meth-
ods of difference and concomitant variation can be defined
roughly as research designs in which two or more cases differ
on a supposed causal variable C and on a dependent variable
E and are similar on at least several other relevant causal
variables. If the difference is in the expected direction, then we
may conclude that the design provides significant support for
the inference that C influenced E, and stronger support than
without the comparison and without the matching. Support is
a matter of degrees, not a dichotomy, in most research. I be-
lieve this is what many contemporary scholars meant when
they claimed to be using Mill’s methods.
This revised version of Mill delivers powerful, well-known
advantages. Contrasting cases carefully adds confirmation
that comes from observing differences in the cause that can-
not be observed in many single case studies. The deliberate
selection of cases that match in other relevant respects elimi-
nect cause to effect. This strength of case methods mitigates
their overall disadvantage when it comes to testing. There are
also ways to make a case study more rigorous in all three
respects (Odell 2004). But on balance my advice to students is
in most cases to avoid claiming to have “tested” a theory
using only case studies, and instead to make more nuanced
claims of other valuable contributions.
I believe the book’s most important shortcoming, though,
is that in its enthusiasm to promote process-tracing, it goes
too far in denigrating a valuable alternative. The book strikes
me as biased against cross-case comparative methods. Chap-
ter 8 is the place where it concentrates on comparative meth-
ods, beginning rightly with Mill’s foundational methods of
agreement, difference, and concomitant variation that repre-
sent the logic of experimentation. I believe the book under-
states the accomplishments and exaggerates the problems of
what it calls controlled comparison—and elsewhere the book
downplays the shortcomings of process-tracing.
Chapter 8 is almost completely silent about the advan-
tages of comparative methods (to be discussed in a moment).
It jumps right to criticisms and limitations. Even though emi-
nent comparativists have used and recommended Mill’s meth-
ods, the book does not analyze exemplars to teach students
what best practice looks like—something it does copiously for
process-tracing. This chapter mentions Skocpol’s States and
Social Revolutions (1979) but mainly to illustrate how pro-
cess-tracing can address limitations of controlled comparison.
To take another example, their appendix mentions Double-
Edged Diplomacy (Evans et al. 1993), but surprisingly they
never mention that every chapter of that book was a two-case
controlled comparison. Outside chapter 8, George and Bennett
mention some other comparative studies approvingly, but for
some reason they do not report the accomplishments of the
comparative method in this chapter.
Chapter 8 complains that an inherent limitation of con-
trolled comparison is that another case may be discovered
later that does not confirm the argument (155). But this is true
of any case study, and yet chapter 10 on process-tracing does
not mention this weakness. That chapter does warn that more
than one explanation may be consistent with evidence but it
praises the technique for being able to make a partial contribu-
tion (222). The same could be said equally for comparative
methods but this book does not say so; on the contrary it uses
this limitation to direct attention away from comparative meth-
ods.
It is true that Mill himself said his methods were difficult
to use in the study of societies, given his scientific goals.
Bennett  and George put it this way: “Mill’s methods can work
well in identifying underlying causal relations only under three
demanding assumptions. First, the causal relation being in-
vestigated must be a deterministic regularity involving only
one condition that is either necessary or sufficient for a speci-
fied outcome. Second, all causally relevant variables must be
identified prior to the analysis...Third, cases that represent the
full range of all logically and socially possible causal paths
must be available for study” (155). Their main conclusion is
that “unfortunately, practically all efforts to make use of the
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nates threats to the inference’s validity that would often be
present without this design. A multiple-case study designed
this way will be more convincing than many single-case stud-
ies and many studies of multiple cases selected without re-
gard to theory. At the same time, the comparative case method
is able to deliver the payoffs of the case study that are lacking
in statistical studies. It is an intermediate technique. And a
sequence of comparative studies can achieve more than any
one alone.
This “approximate” method of difference does require
caveats. History always presents, in a given set of cases,
variables besides the study variable that also varied and also
might have contributed to the outcome variation. The author
must therefore acknowledge that more research will be needed
to sort out those causes with greater clarity and certainty.
And the more such variables that are present in a given set of
cases, the weaker the study’s design will be. It will usually be
too much to claim, from only two or three cases, to have found
all possible causal pathways or to have ruled out all interac-
tion effects. We do run a risk of being misunderstood if we
claim to be using Mill’s methods but do not specify that we
aspire to a more realistic philosophical standard than Mill’s
own. But Copi and Cohen (1990, 407), a book George and
Bennett cite approvingly, sums up the conclusion well: “Mill’s
methods are more limited instruments than Bacon and Mill
conceived them to be, but within those limits they are indis-
pensable.”
Every other social science method also turns out to be in-
herently imperfect in some respect and also requires caveats.
Every process-tracing study requires the caveat that the case
could be unrepresentative, even of the type being theorized.
A regression study with 10,000 observations will be mislead-
ing if measurement error or omitted variables are significant,
and many do not demonstrate directly that the alleged causal
mechanism actually operates. Experiments have their own in-
herent limitations. Unfortunately there simply is no escape
from methodological tradeoffs and complementarity in social
science.
Thus, I believe additional materials will be needed in my
course on qualitative research design to teach students how
to use comparative methods well. But overall, this book is the
fullest presentation of the methodological advice of one of
our most admired leaders. Its many strengths, due to long
experience and sophisticated reflection by Bennett as well,
are likely to earn it wide and lasting influence in political sci-
ence. It will help scholars raise the quality of future case study
research.
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In the early 1980s, when I wanted to provide some guid-
ance to graduate students on case study methodology, I would
direct them to Alexander George’s published 1979 essay and
then to his 1982 conference paper on “Case Studies and Theory
Development.” I continued to assign the unpublished essay
for nearly fifteen years, until early draft chapters of the George
and Bennett book manuscript became available. With the pub-
lication of George and Bennett’s Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences, any uncertainty about
which primary text to use for a course on qualitative research
methods has evaporated, even with the recent proliferation of
many excellent articles and books on the case study method.1
This long-awaited book has been well worth the wait. It
refines George’s pathbreaking work on the method of struc-
tured focused comparison, process tracing, and other topics
in case study methodology; makes important advances in his
earlier ideas on typological theory; thoroughly grounds the
approach in the philosophy of science; argues for the compat-
ibility of case study methods and quantitative methods; and
provides a useful “how to” manual for students. It will be
widely read and widely cited. For any graduate student using
case studies in his or her dissertation, or for anyone interested
in a minimal familiarity with the many diverse methodological
approaches in the discipline,2 this book is like the American
Express card. You should not leave school without it.
There are many things that I like about the book. At the
most basic level, I like the theme of converting descriptive
explanations of historical cases into analytic explanations, a
theme that George (1979, 1982) has been emphasizing for a
quarter century. I like the emphasis on the interplay between
theory  and evidence, a theme that goes back at least to George
and Smoke (1974). Theory is used to structure the interpreta-
Well Worth the Wait
Jack S. Levy
Rutgers University
jacklevy@rci.rutgers.edu
